Two long-standing open problems exist on the fringe of Complexity Theory and Cryptography:
Introduction
Consider the following important and outstanding open questions on the fringe of Complexity Theory and Cryptography:
Does there exist a reduction from an NP-Complete
Problem to a one-way function (OWF)?
2. Do parallelized versions of classical constant-round zero-knowledge proofs for NP (such as [26, 9] ) conceal every "hard" bit of the witness to the statement proved?
The first question originates in the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [11] , and is very related to the fundamental and well-studied question of worst-case to average-case reductions. The second question is motivated by the celebrated notion of zero-knowledge proofs [24] and dates back to the Ph.D. thesis of Feige [14] . In this paper we show a somewhat surprising connection between these seemingly unrelated problems. Roughly speaking, our main results shows that, unless the Polynomial-Hierarchy collapses, black-box reductions cannot be used to provide positive answers to both questions. In other words, with respect to black-box reductions the answer to either question 1 or question 2 is "no" (unless the Polynomial-Hierarchy collapses).
Before further discussing our results, let us start by providing some background on the above questions, as well as a brief overview of known related results.
Background on the Problems
All previous works concerning both of the above questions exclusively consider black-box reductions. Thus, in the remainder of this section we refrain from explicitly stating this.
OWFs Based on NP-Hardness
The notion of a one-way function is at the heart of modern cryptography. It is the most basic cryptographic primitive, and its existence is implied by most other cryptographic notions. Furthermore, by the results of [29, 22] , this basic notion implies the existence of private-key encryption schemes. A very fundamental open question is whether the existence of one-way functions can be based on some other "weaker" assumption, such as a worst-case assumption of the type NP ⊂ BPP. Results indicating both positive and negative answers to the above question have appeared in the literature. corollary, they obtain that the existence of a non-adaptive reduction from an NP-complete problem to a OWF implies the collapse of the hierarchy. A recent results by Akavia et al. [3] obtains a stronger collapse of the PH, by directly considering reductions to a OWF (and thus taking advantage of the extra one-wayness property of the average-case problem at hand).
Another approach for providing a negative answer to question 1 is to rule out the existence of reductions from worst-case problems to functions that are one-way on the worst-case. As pointed out in [8] , this approach alone is not sufficient to provide a negative answer for general one-way functions, since indeed it is easy to construct a worst-case one-way function based on the assumption that NP ⊂ BPP. 1 Nevertheless, this approach has been successfully used to rule out the existence of reductions to specific types of one-way functions. More than two decades ago, Brassard [6] observes that the existence of a deterministic reduction from an NP-complete problem to a worstcase one-way permutation implies that coNP ⊆ NP. Very recently, Akavia et al [3] obtain the first impossibility result for arbitrary probabilistic and adaptive (black-box) reductions, showing that the existence of reductions from an NP-complete problem to a regular one-way function with efficiently recognizable range (and more generally, so called size-verifiable one-way functions, i.e., one-way function for which there exists an AM proof showing the size of any pre-image set) implies the collapse of the PH. The result of [3] also rules out the existence of reductions from an NP-complete problem to functions that are one-way on the worst-case.
Positive results
On the positive side, Ajtai [1] shows how to construct a one-way function based on the worst-case hardness of a specific problem (which is in NP ∩ coNP). Other constructions of this type have been presented by e.g. Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi [19] , Micciancio [27] , Micciancio-Regev [28] , Ajtai-Dwork [2] and Regev [34] . All the worst-case problems that are used for these constructions are however in NP ∩ coNP and are therefore unlikely to be NP-complete.
Summary
To sum up, known negative results concerning question 1, either rule out restricted types of reductions (i.e., non-adaptive reductions), or rule out reductions to restricted types of one-way functions (e.g. regular one-way functions with an efficiently recognizable range). Thus, given our current understanding it is still conceivable that there exists an adaptive reduction from an NP-complete problem to a oneto-one OWF!
Parallel Repetition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [24] , are interactive proofs that have the paradoxical property of not revealing any information beyond the validity of the assertion. Very soon after their conception, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW) [26] show the existence of a constant-round zero-knowledge publiccoin (i.e., Arthur-Merlin (AM)) proof system for NP, based on the existence of one-way functions. Unfortunately, the constant-round protocol of GMW (as well as a subsequent protocol by Blum [9] ) only has constant soundness error. A natural question that arises is whether the "parallelized" version of the GMW protocol (i.e., the protocol obtained by parallel repetition of the GMW protocol), which clearly have "small" soundness error, remains zero-knowledge. 2 Goldreich and Krawczyk [20] show that this protocol, and any other constant-round AM proof for NP with negligible soundness error cannot be black-box zero-knowledge, i.e., the zero-knowledge property cannot be demonstrated by simply using the verifier as a black-box. However, to date it is still unknown whether the parallelized version of the GMW protocol (or any other constant-round AM proof system for NP e.g., [9] ) "leaks" some "useful" knowledge. In particular, an outstanding open question is whether this protocol, or any other constant-round AM proof system for NP, with negligible soundness error, hides all "hard" bits of the witness to the statement proved -it is very conceivable that the parallelized GMW protocol is not zeroknowledge, but still hides all hard bits of the witness! 3 As with question 1, results indicating both positive and negative answers to the above question have appeared in the literature.
Positive Results Feige and Shamir [15] define the notion of Witness Indistinguishability (WI). Roughly speaking a proof system is WI if it does not reveal (in a computational sense) what witness the prover is using to provide the proof. Interestingly, Feige and Shamir [15] show that the parallelized version of the GMW (and Blum) protocol is WI, providing hope of the possibility of proving that this protocol also hides all hard bits of the witness.
A related and seemingly stronger property, called Strong Witness Indistinguishability (sWI) was introduced by Goldreich [17, 18] . Roughly speaking, a proof system is sWI if proofs of computationally indistinguishable statements are computationally indistinguishable. It is unknown whether the parallelized version of the GMW proof system, or any other constant-round AM proof system for NP, with negligible soundness error, is sWI. 4 Feige and Shamir [15] also define the notion of Witness Hiding. Roughly speaking a proof system is witness hiding if it does not reveal the whole witness of the statement proved. Although Feige and Shamir obtain witness hiding AM proofs for "hard" languages, it is unknown whether the parallelized GMW protocol (or any other constant-round AM proof for NP) is witness hiding.
Pass [32] considers interactive proofs that can be simulated in quasi-polynomial time. As is noted in [32] , such proof systems have the property of hiding all predicates of the witness that are hard for quasi-polynomial time (as opposed to polynomial-time). Interestingly, such proof systems are significantly simpler to construct than traditional zero-knowledge proofs, and indeed a parallelized version of the GMW proof system does satisfy this property (see [12, 32] ).
Negative Results
As already mentioned, Goldreich and Krawczyk [20] show that constant-round AM proof systems with negligible soundness error, that are black-box zero-knowledge, only exists for languages in BPP. Goldreich and Krawczyk [20] also present certain (artificial) zeroknowledge proof systems that provably reveal the whole witnesss of the statement proved, when executed in parallel.
Summary Again, to sum up, previous results regarding question 2 can be divided into two categories: (1) (blackbox) impossibility results for AM proofs satisfying stronger properties than "bit-hiding", and (2) results showing that parallelized versions of classical zero-knowledge proofs satisfy weaker or incomparable notions.
Our Results
In our treatment we tackle both the above questions in their full generality, i.e., we do not put any restrictions on type of reductions used (more then it being black-box), nor any restrictions on the one-way function. However, rather than addressing each of them separately, we show an intimate connection between them.
As already mentioned, our main result show that unless the PH collapses, black-box reductions cannot be used to provide positive answers to both question 1 and question 2. A bit more precisely (but still informally), we stipulate question 1 as follows.
Does there exist a function f : {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} * and a black-box reduction R 1 from deciding the language SAT to inverting f (on the average), i.e., for every machine A that inverts f with polynomial probability, there exists some polynomial p(n), such that R A 1 decides SAT with probability 1/2 + 1 p(n) on instances of length n.
We generalize question 2 as follows (since we are proving a lower bound this generalization only makes our result stronger).
2. Does there exists a (constant-round) Arthur-Merlin proof system (P BitHid , V BitHid ) for SAT, which is based on the existence of OWFs and has negligible soundness error, and a black-box reduction R 2 for showing that (P BitHid , V BitHid ) conceals every "hard" bit of the witness used by P BitHid , i.e., for every machine A that predicts a particular bit with polynomial advantage after hearing a proof, R A 2 predicts the same bit with polynomial advantage without hearing the proof.
Note that the parallelized versions of classical zeroknowledge proof systems for NP (such as [26] and [9] ) indeed are AM proof systems which are based on the existence of OWFs, and have negligible soundness error. Thus, a negative answer to question 2 above, in particular, implies the impossibility of using black-box reductions to demonstrate a bit-hiding property of the parallelized versions of these classical zero-knowledge proof systems.
Our main result states that the if the answer to both the above questions is "yes", then SAT ∈ coAM which by a result of Boppana, Håstad and Zachos [5] implies the collapse of the PH (i.e., unless the PH collapses, the answer to at least one of the questions is no).
We also show that the same result holds if replacing Question 2 with the following question regarding strongly Witness Indistinguishable proofs:
3. Does there exists a constant-round Arthur-Merlin proof system (P sWI , V sWI ) for SAT, which is based on the existence of OWFs and has negligible soundness error, and a black-box reduction R 3 for showing that (P sWI , V sWI ) is strongly Witness Indistinguishable? 5
A Note on Non Black-Box Reductions
Note that it is possible that non black-box reductions can be successful where black-box reductions fail. In particular, in a recent result by Barak [4] , a constant-round publiccoin zero-knowledge argument (i.e., with only computational soundness) system for NP is shown. The striking feature of the protocol of Barak is that the zero-knowledge property is demonstrated using a non black-box simulator. We mention, however, that currently no non black-box reductions are known for interactive proof systems (as opposed to arguments), or for worst-case to average case reductions.
Our Techniques
As observed by Akavia et al [3] , it is easy to show that the existence of a reduction from SAT to a one-way permutation, implies that coSAT ∈ AM: Assume the existence of a reduction R such that R A decides SAT, for every machine A that inverts the one-way permutation f . The AM proof for coSAT would simply let the verifier start by picking a random tape for the reduction R, which is sent to the prover, and then the prover is supposed to provide the answers to all queries made by the reduction on this particular random tape. The verifier accepts if (1) the reduction rejects the instance given the answers provided by the prover, and (2) the prover's answers are consistent with f and the queries made by R. Since f is a one-way permutation, the following properties hold: a) there is only one "correct" answer to the queries of R, and b) the validity of the answer can be efficiently checked. This means that the verifier can efficiently verify that the prover provides exactly the same answers as an oracle for inverting the one-way permutation would have.
As pointed out by Akavia et al, if we instead consider a general one-way function (instead of a one-way permutation), the above approach cannot be directly used; the reason being that some queries to the "inversion oracle" might not have any answers at all (which cannot be efficiently checked), or can have many answers. Akavia et al. show how to modify the above approach to work also for reductions to regular 6 one-way functions with an efficiently recognizable range (or more generally, so called size-verifiable one-way functions, i.e., one-way function for which there exists an AM proof showing the size of any pre-image set). On a very high-level (and very oversimplified), this is obtained by a) using universal hashing [13] to "force" the prover to only have a single possible answer (see e.g [35, 21] ), and b) using the efficiently recognizable range condition, in order to let the verifier check when there are no answers to some oracle query.
In our treatment we instead start of with a general oneway function, which we transform into an interactive "object", i.e., a game, that roughly speaking has the same "characteristics" as a one-way permutation -there is only valid answer to each query asked in the game, and the validity of the answer can be efficiently checked. The construction of this game relies on the existence of a bit-hiding (or strongly witness indistinguishable) AM proof for NP, with a blackbox reduction. On a very high-level, the construction can be described as follows: (1) We use the OWF to generate a hard instance of a promise-NP ∩ coNP problem -this instance is the query. (2) We then rely on the bit-hiding AM proof, to prove that the instance generated indeed is in the promise. Oversimplifying, the game results in the generation of a "hard" query for which (1) the answer is unique, and (2) there exists a "certificate" (namely the NP-witness) to each valid answer.
Once an appropriate game has been constructed, we then apply the above-mentioned approach of [3] to show that, assuming the existence of a black-box bit-hiding AM proof for NP which is based on the existence of OWFs, the existence of a black-box reduction from SAT to a OWF implies that SAT ∈ coAM.
One crucial ingredients in the construction of our game is the result of Håstad, Impagliazzo, Luby and Levin [29] providing a black-box reduction from a OWF to a pseudorandom generator. We furthermore employ techniques from the black-box lower-bound for zero-knowledge proofs of Goldreich and Krawczyk [20] , the commitment scheme of Naor [31] and the construction of a hard-on-the average promise-NP ∩ coNP problem from a OWF, of Pass and Shelat [33] .
Overview
In Section 2 and 3 we provide some notation and preliminaries. Section 4 contains formal definitions of the problems considered. Section 5 contains a formal statement of our main results and a proof outline. The remainder of the proof is found in Section 6.
Notation
We shall follow, almost verbatim, [10] and [25] . Namely, Integer and string representation. We denote by N the set of natural numbers: 0, 1, 2, . . .. Unless otherwise specified, a natural number is presented in its binary expansion (with no leading 0s) whenever given as an input to an algorithm. If n ∈ N , we denote by 1 n the unary expansion of n (i.e., the concatenation of n 1's). Given a string x, we let x| i denote the i'th bit of x.
Negligible functions. The term "negligible" is used for denoting functions that are asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any fixed polynomial. More precisely, a function ν(·) from non-negative integers to reals is called negligible if for every constant c > 0 and all sufficiently large n, it holds that ν(n) < n −c .
Probabilistic algorithms.
If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input x, the notation "A(x)" refers to the probability space that assigns to the string σ the probability that A, on input x, outputs σ.
Probabilistic assignments. If S is a probability space and p a predicate, then "x R ← S" denotes the elementary probabilistic algorithm consisting of choosing an element x at random according to S and returning x, and "x R ← S | p(x)" that of choosing x according to S until p(x) is true and then returning x.
Probabilistic experiments. Let p be a predicate and S 1 , S 2 , . . . probability spaces, then the notation
. .) will be true after the ordered execution of the probabilistic assignments 
Preliminaries
Black-box reductions We start by defining the notion of a black-box reduction.
Definition 1 (Black-box reduction) A black-box reduction is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine.

Witness Relations, SAT, and Deciding Languages
We recall the definition of a witness relation for an NP language [17] .
Definition 2 (Witness relation) A witness relation for a language L ∈ NP is a binary relation R L that is polynomially bounded, polynomial time recognizable and characterizes L by
We say that w is a witness for the membership
Let SAT denote the language of all satisfiable formulas, i.e., SAT = {φ|SAT (φ) = 1}. Let R SAT denote some canonical witness relation for the language SAT.
We recall what it means to BPP-decide a language. 
Inverting functions Recall the standard definition of what it means to invert a function with noticeable probability.
Definition 4 (Inverting functions)
* be a function, and let A be a probabilistic Turing Machine. Then A is said to invert the function f with advantage p(n) on instances of length n if
A is said to invert the function f if there exist a polynomial p(n) such that for all n ∈ N , A inverts f with advantage p(n) on instances of length n.
Hard Bits A bit is said to be computationally hard if it cannot be predicted by a polynomial-time machine significantly better than a random guess. We here focus on the prediction of bits of witnesses for NP languages. 
Definition 5 (Predicting a bit) Let
A is said to predict bit i(·) on {D n } n∈N if there exists some polynomial p such that for all n ∈ N , A predicts bit i with advantage p(n) on D n .
Interactive Proof Systems and Arthur-Merlin Games The notions of Interactive Proof Systems and
Arthur-Merlin Games were respectively and independently introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [24] , and Babai and Moran [7] . Arthur-Merlin (AM) games/proof are interactive proofs where the Verifier does not use any private randomness. • Completeness:
• Soundness: For every x / ∈ L, and every interactive machine P
Let P (w), V (x) denote the output of V on input x after interacting with P on the common input x and the private input w.
Definition 7 (Arthur-Merlin Proof System [7] ) Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system for the language L. Then (P, V ) is said to be an Arthur-Merlin (AM) proof system if the following conditions hold:
is a public-coin protocol, i.e., the messages that V sends to P are disjoint subsets (of fixed length) of its random tape.
(P, V ) is a constant-round protocol.
Remarks:
1. We have preferred to use the name Arthur-Merlin proof systems instead of Arthur-Merlin games as it was originally denoted in [7] in order to emphasize the fact that such proof systems are special cases of Interactive Proof Systems.
2. Note that in our definition of Arthur-Merlin proof systems we require that the proof system is constantround. We remark that although this was not part of the original definition by Babai and Moran, it has today become the standard way of defining AM proof systems. 
Specification of the Questions
We provide formal definitions of the questions mentioned in the introduction.
Reductions from SAT to a OWF
The existence of a black-box reduction for providing a positive answer to Question 1 is stated in the Assumption below. 
Assumption 1 (Reduction from SAT to a OWF)
Reductions for Bit-hiding AM proofs
We formally state the assumption that there exist a blackbox reduction for providing a positive answer to Question 2. Recall that Question 2 considers AM proof systems that are based on the existence of OWFs. To make Assumption 2 as weak as possible we do not require that the AM proof makes black-box use of this function; rather we consider a class of AM proofs which is specified by the OWF.
Assumption 2 (Bit-hiding AM proofs from OWFs)
There exists a class of AM proof systems 
Then there exists a polynomial p(n) such that for all n ∈ N either R A
inverts f with advantage p(n) on instances of lenght n, or R
Remark : Note that Assumption 2 only guarantees the existence of an AM proof with a very "weak" bit-hiding property. In particular, we only require a reduction from an machine that predicts the bit with very high probability after hearing a proof to an machine that predicts it with a noticeable (i.e., polynomial) advantage, without hearing the proof.
Reductions for Strong-WI AM Proofs
We also consider an alternative to Assumption 2 stipulating the existence of a AM proof for NP that satisfies a weak form of strong Witness Indistinguishability (sWI) which is provable using a black-box reduction. (Recall that roughly speaking, a proof system is sWI if proofs of computationally indistinguishable statements are computationally indistinguishable.) 
Assumption 3 (Strong-WI AM proofs from OWFs) There exists a class of AM proof systems
inverts f with advantage p(n) on instances of lenght n, or
Remark : Note again that Assumption 3 only guarantees the existence of a AM proof with a very "weak" sWI property. In particular, the reduction needs only to work for machines that predict what distribution the instance came from, with very high probability.
Main Theorem and Proof Outline
Our main result shows the following:
Theorem 1 If Assumptions 1 and 2 (or Assumption 1 and 3) are true then SAT ∈ coAM.
By applying the result of Boppana, Håstad and Zachos [5] we thus obtain that the validity of Assumption 1 and 2 (or Assumption 1 and 3) implies the collapse of the Polynomial Hierarchy.
Outline of the Proof of Theorem 1
Our proof proceeds in two steps.
1. We start by defining an interactive game G, and show a black-box reduction R G from inverting the function f to winning in the game G -in other words, consider any player A G that succeeds in winning in the game G; then R AG G inverts the function f . The main idea behind the construction of the game G is to use interaction in order to generate an instance that with overwhelming probability will be in the promise of a promise-NP ∩ coNP problem. The player A G that participates in the game is then supposed to decide the instance generated. We hint that the bit-hiding (or sWI) AM proof is here used in order to guarantee that an instance in the promise has been generated. The bithiding (or sWI) property of the AM proof furthermore guarantees that this proof does not significantly help the player A G to decide the generated instance.
2. In the second step we show that the existence of a black-box reduction Z from deciding the language L to winning in the game G, implies that L ∈ coAM. We here rely on the fact that with overwhelming probability there exist a witness (for containment or noncontainment) for the "instances" generated in interactive game G. The main technical challenge here is to show that (with high-probability) the reduction Z will not be able to generate instances that are not in the promise of our promise-NP ∩ coNP problem. Intuitively, this should follow from the soundness of the AM proof used in the game. However, since the reduction might actually rewind and restart the oracle it has access to, "regular" soundness of the AM proof is not sufficient. We overcome this problem by relying on the the public-coin, constant-round and "unconditional" soundness 8 of the AM proof, and using techniques similar to those of Goldreich and Krawczyk [20] .
By combining the above two steps we have shown that the existence of a black-box reduction R 1 from deciding SAT to inverting f implies (by step 1) that there exist a black-box reduction Z (which is obtained by combining R 1 and R G ) from deciding SAT to winning in the game G, which (by step 2) implies that SAT ∈ coAM.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1 -Defining the Game G.
The game G consist of an interaction (i.e., an exchange of messages) between a challenge generator CG, and a player A G . On a high-level, this interaction proceeds in two stages. The first stage (called the preamble phase) consist of an interaction after which the player A G (with highprobability) will receive two strings q 0 , q 1 , one of which will be in the support of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) [7] , while the other one is not. In the second stage (called the Guess Phase), the task of the player A G is to decide which of the strings is in the support of the PRG. Looking ahead, the idea behind such a game is that there exists a NP certificate (namely the seed to the PRG) for the validity of the answer of the player.
We remark that the idea of using a pair of strings, one of which is in the range of a PRG, originates from Naor's commitment scheme [31] . Such a construction was also recently used by Pass and Shelat [33] in order to reduce a OWF to a promise-NP ∩ coNP problem that is hard on the average, and where instances in the promise can be efficiently generated (with overwhelming probability): a pair q 0 , q 1 is said to be a YES-instance if q 0 is in the range of the PRG and q 1 is not, and a NO-instance if q 1 is in the range of the PRG but q 0 is not. Note that both YES and NO instances are easy to generate with overwhelming probability, by picking one random string in the domain of the PRG and applying the PRG, and one "long" random string; with overwhelming probability the long random string will not be in the range of the PRG. Furthermore, it holds that randomly generated YES-instances are indistinguishable from randomly generated NO-instances, which means that the language is hard to decide (on the promise).
In our construction of the game we augment the generation process of [33, 31] in two ways in order to make sure that with overwhelming probability only instances in the promise can be generated (even if the party that generates the instance is acting maliciously):
1. Just as in Naor [31] , a "coin-tossing" is used to guarantee that the probability that both strings q 0 and q 1 are in the range of the PRG, is negligible.
2. The generating party is furthermore required to provide a proof that at least one of q 0 and q 1 is in the range of the PRG. In order to guarantee that it is still hard to distinguish YES-instances from NO-instance also after receiving this proof, we here rely on the AM proof (P BitHid , V BitHid ) from Assumption 2 (or (P sWI , V sWI ) from Assumption 3).
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Defining G. More formally, game G f is defined as follows for player A G . Use the function f to construct a PRG g (using the construction of Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin and Luby (HILL) [29] . Player A G on input 1 n interacts with the (exponential-time) challenge generator CG defined as follows.
Preamble Phase
CG on input 1
n waits to receive a string r ∈ {0, 1} n from A G .
It then lets b
⊕ r, and sends the "challenge" q 0 , q 1 to A G .
3. Furthermore CG uses the AM proof sys-
to provide an interactive proof to A G that q 0 and q 1 are wellformed, i.e., that there exist a bit b and string s ∈ {0, 1} n/3 such that q b = g(s ), q 1−b = g(s ) ⊕ r -the witness used for this NPstatement is (b , s ). Let (P G , V G ) denote the proof system used.
Guess Phase
1. After the preamble phase has finished CG waits to receive a "guess"b from A G .
2. CG outputs win ifb = b or if CG failed in the AM proof in the preamble (which can be checked since (P G , V G ) is public coin). Otherwise it outputs loose.
We say that an player A G is able to win in the game G f if there exists some negligible function μ, such that CG outputs win with probability 1 − μ(n) when interacting with A G , on common input 1 n .
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 is true. Then there exists a black-box reduction R G from inverting the function f to winning in the game G f defined above. In other words, for every machine A G that wins in the game
The proposition follows using "standard" cryptographic proof techniques. We show that any machine A G that wins in the game G f can be used (in a black-box way) to invert f .
Consider the distribution D n defined as follows:
e., let r be the first output of A G ).
Emulate CG upon receiving the string r from
We first claim that with overwhelming probability over samples (x, w) R ← D n , A G is able to predict the first bit of the witness w (i.e., b) after interacting with P BitHid (x, w). This follows directly from our assumption that A G wins in G f , and from the fact that the distribution D n together with P BitHid perfectly emulate G f . By assumption 2, it thus holds that R AG 2 either inverts f , or predicts the bit i = 1 on D n . In other words, either R AG 2 inverts f or it distinguishes between the following distributions:
Now, note that replacing the pseudo-random sequence in the above distributions with a truly random sequence would make the distributions identical, i.e., the following distributions are identical:
It follows that R AG 2 either inverts f or distinguishes between either the distributions
can be turned, in a black-box way, into a machine that either inverts f , or distinguishes the output of g on a random input, from a truly random string -i.e., we obtain a reduction from contradicting the pseudorandomness of g to winning in the game G f . Finally, by combining the above reduction with HILL [29] , we have obtained an reduction from inverting f to winning in G f . 2. Emulate CG upon receiving the string r from A G : let s
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 3 is true. Then there exists a black-box reduction R G from inverting the function f to winning in the game
It follows using the same argument as in the proof of Propo-
with overwhelming probability. By assumption 3, it thus holds that R AG 3 either inverts f , or distinguishes between the distributions:
We now conclude using exactly the same proof as in Proposition 1, that there exists a reduction from inverting f to winning in G f .
Remarks:
1. Note that in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, we only rely on the bit-hiding (or sWI) property of the AM proof system. The constant-round, public-coin and the unconditional soundness properties will be important in the second step of the proof of the main theorem.
2. Also note that if the player A G honestly follows its instructions, then except with negligible probability it holds that either (1) the proof was rejecting (which is publicly verifiable) or (2) q 0 and q 1 have the property that one of them is in the support of g while the other is not. This property will also be crucial in the second step of the proof.
3. Finally, note that the "preamble phase" in the game is not necessarily efficiently computable. This follows from the fact that the AM proof system does not necessarily have an efficient prover strategy. 
Step 2 -Showing that SAT ∈ coAM
We show the following proposition which combined with Proposition 3 yields the main theorem: Proof: Suppose the hypothesis of the claim is true. Let m = m(n) denote the running time of Z on inputs of length n. Let H n denote the set of m-wise independent hashfunctions h : {0, 1}
(n) → {0, 1} (n) where denotes the total communication complexity of the game G f on input 1 n . We define a specific (exponential-time) machineÃ G which satisfies the following properties: (1) for almost every h ∈ H n ,Ã G (h) wins in the game G f on input 1 n , and (2) for a random h ∈ H h , Z will (almost) never be able to convinceÃ G (h) of any false statements, even if Z rewinds or restartsÃ G (h). We then useÃ G in order to construct an AM-proof for the complement of L. In this construction, both the above properties are crucial.
Given a h ∈ H n , consider the (exponential-time) machineÃ G (h) defined as follows:
1.Ã G sends the first n bits of h(0) as its first message in the game.
2. When requested to send an l bit long random challenge as part of the AM proof (P G , V G ),Ã G applies h to the history of all messages received in the game, to obtain the string c, and sends the first l bits of c. (The reason for using the hashfunction h is to guarantee thatÃ G will (almost) never accept false statement, even ifÃ G is rewound or restarted.) We start by noting that for almost every h ∈ H n ,Ã G (h) wins in the game G f on input 1 n .
Claim 1 Except for a negligible fraction of
Proof: Consider a random h ∈ H n . By a counting argument (see Naor [31] ), it holds that except with negligible probability (over the choice of h) one of q 0 and q 1 is in the support of g, while the other is not. (This follows from the fact that the string r = h(0) sent byÃ G is truly random if h is a random function in H n .) We conclude that except with negligible probability over the choice of h, we end up in a situation where the bit b is uniquely defined, which means thatÃ G will correctly determine the bit b (or the proof will be rejecting, in which caseÃ G also succeeds).
LetL denote the complement language of L. We show that the protocol (PL, VL) defined below is a 2-round AM proof forL. (The proof system (PL, VL) "only" has completeness 1/2 + 1 p(n) and soundness error 1/2 + 1 p(n) ,where n is the instance lenght and p is a polynomial. However, standard repetition can be used to boost both the completeness and soundness error.) This concludes thatL ∈ AM .
The AM proof (PL, VL) forL:
1. Verifier VL sends an m-bit long random string r Z ∈ {0, 1} m and an random m-wise independent hashfunction h ∈ H n , to PL.
Prover PL proceeds as follows:
(a) PL initiates an execution ofÃ G (h).
(b) PL then executes Z with random coins fixed to r Z , providing it with oracle access toÃ G (h). (c) If all checks succeed, VL accepts, and rejects otherwise.
We start by noting that since Z is probabilistic polynomialtime, VL will be so as well. The proposition now follows from the following two claims.
Claim 2
There exists a polynomial p c such that (PL, VL) has completeness 1/2 + 1 pc(n) on instances of length n.
Proof:
Recall that by Claim 1, for all but a negligible fraction of h ∈ H n ,Ã G (h) wins in game G f . By our assumptions on Z, it thus holds that there exists a polynomial p , such that for all but a negligible fraction of h ∈ H n , ZÃ G (h) outputs 0 with probability (at least) 1/2+ on input x ∈L given a random h ∈ H n .
Since VL "truthfully" picks the "random tape" for Z and a random hashfunction h ∈ H n forÃ G , it follows that PL's emulation of Z andÃ G , with the random tape and hashfunction supplied by VL results in Z outputting 0 with probability (at least) 1/2 + 1 p (|x|) on input x ∈L. It thus holds that the probability that VL accepts a proof of true statement is 1/2 + 1 p (|x|) minus the probability that that the answers a 1 , .., a m provided by PL are "rejected" in Step 3 (b). Recall that by the definition ofÃ G , a certificate to its answers always exists unless it outputs rejected-proof or fail. FurthermoreÃ G only outputs rejected-proof if the AM proof in the preamble phase was rejecting, which means that in this case VL will always accepts. We conclude that VL only rejects the proof in Step 3 (b) if one of the answers a 1 , .., a m is fail. However, by a counting argument (see Naor [31] ) it follows that this happens only with negligible probability. (Note that we here rely on the fact thatÃ G generates its first messages r in the game as h(0), which is a truly random string is h is randomly chosen in H n .) It follows that there exist a polynomial p c such that VL accepts proofs of valid statements with probability at least 1/2+ 1 pc(|x|) .
Claim 3 There exists a polynomial p s such that (PL, VL)
has soundness error 1/2 − ness error. In particular, note that the unconditional soundness property is due to the fact that the cheating prover P * must emulateÃ G , which requires exponential time (in order to decide the bit b).
